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For over thirty years, Turkey has sought membership in what is today called
the European Union (EU). This article argues that the most likely scenario
to reach that goal is that Ankara will speed up its efforts to meet the EU’s
membership criteria, and that the EU will begin accession talks and later
admit Turkey as a member in a reasonable time period. There are two main
reasons for this. The first is that Turkey’s determination to meet the acces-
sion criteria has increased in the post-9/11 era. Today, a growing number of
Turkish people concur that meeting the accession criteria, let alone acquir-
ing full membership, will serve Turkey’s interests. This is especially true
when security considerations are taken into account. The second reason is
that the EU itself has started to change its attitude toward Turkey’s mem-
bership application. An increasing number of EU citizens now believe that
the membership of a gradually “Europeanizing” Turkey will be in the EU’s
interests, mainly defined in terms of security and identity considerations.
H. Tarýk Oguzlu is assistant professor of international relations at Bilkent University,
Ankara.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKEY’S VIEW OF THE EU UNTIL
THE LATE 1990S
Thirty years after the signing of the association agreement, Turkey-EU rela-
tions have undergone radical change. Since 1996, Turkey has been in a cus-
toms union agreement with the EU and, since late 1999, Turkey has been
a membership candidate with full membership ostensibly dependent upon
its meeting a set of criteria (i.e., the Copenhagen criteria) that has been
applied to all other recent aspirant countries. Since 1999 and following the
announcement of Turkey’s candidacy, there have been radical develop-
ments in EU-Turkey relations. With the accession partnership document
and Turkey’s national program, Ankara is today closer to the EU than ever
before. Turkey and the EU finally solved their dispute over the European
security and defence policy (ESDP) in 2002, and the decision adopted at the
Copenhagen summit in December 2002 for the first time overtly stated
that accession talks with Turkey should start without further delay, provid-
ed that the European Commission report of late 2004 recommended this.
In the November 2002 elections, the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
came to power in Ankara, and because of the party’s prevailing pro-EU
inclinations the pace of reform has also increased, not only in the domestic
sphere but also in Turkey’s foreign policy practices. Lastly, at the December
2004 Brussels summit, the European Union agreed to start the accession
talks with Turkey in October 2005 pending Turkey’s prior approval of
extending the customs union agreement to the recently admitted 10 EU
members, including the Republic of Cyprus.
However promising such developments might appear for achieving
Ankara’s long-held goal of EU membership, problems remain. First,
Turkey’s approach towards the EU has traditionally rested on ideological
grounds, rather than on a rational cost-benefit analysis. Turkey has long
argued that it should be admitted to the union due to its European charac-
ter. At the same time, the majority of the Turkish elites have believed that
to solidify Turkey’s European/western/modern identity, EU membership is
a must. The problem with such an approach has been that Turkish policy-
makers have long failed to understand why the EU members hesitated to
offer a clear membership prospect to Turkey based on their own cost-bene-
fit calculations.1 Turkish elites have tended to believe that just as Turkey
1 Malcom Cooper, “The legacy of Ataturk: Turkish political structures and policymaking,”
International Affairs 78, no. 1 (2002): 115-28.
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wants to join the EU on identity related grounds, the EU also adopts the
same rationale vis-à-vis Turkey. Rather than believing that the EU’s reluc-
tance might emanate from its own cost-benefit calculations with respect to
Turkey’s admission, Ankara has long believed that the EU does not want
Turkey mainly because it sees Turkey as non-European.
Second, the majority of the Turkish elites have long thought that Turkey
has the right to join the EU, as article 28 of the 1964 Association treaty
vaguely mentions this possibility. Consequently, within this perspective,
the main responsibility for Turkey’s accession to the union rests with the
Europeans. The oft-repeated Turkish argument has been that because the
EU members did not offer clear membership timetables to Turkey, the lat-
ter did not feel encouraged to go through the painful transformation
process. This shows that the Turkish leadership has long indexed EU-relat-
ed reforms to the possibility that the EU will offer membership status to
Turkey. Ankara has tended to argue that the processes of liberalization and
democratization should not be tied to (or conceived as a part of) Turkey’s
EU membership process. However, the close relationship between these
processes has nonetheless been assumed.
Third, for Turkey, the EU has mainly been considered an intergov-
ernmental organization. The postsovereign/postnational/postmodern
aspects of that organization have been overlooked. This has deprived the
Turkish elites of the ability to grasp the identity-transforming character-
istics of the EU project, particularly as it evolved in the 1990s. It has also
led Ankara to believe that the relationship with Brussels would be equal
and symmetric. The EU was considered a significant economic organi-
zation in the western international community that is led by the US-
NATO, rather than a distinctive international actor with its own evolving
identity.2
Fourth, due to its well-established security culture, members of the
Turkish military and foreign policy elites have tended to think that their
country’s integration into the EU was likely because of close strategic secu-
rity relations with the European powers within NATO. Turkey’s geopolitical
significance and its military capabilities are believed to enhance Ankara’s
2 Meltem Müftüler-Bac, Turkey’s Relations with A Changing Europe (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1997).
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candidacy.3 The fact that Turkey stood on a par with the European allies
within a Eurocentric intergovernmental NATO during the Cold War seems
to have led many in Turkey to believe that the country’s Europeanness
would not be contested by the EU members in the 1990s.4
It seems that Turkey’s leaders long failed to comprehend the nature of
the EU’s integration process in the 1990s, as well as to assess the impact of
the EU’s integration process on its own security interests. Such differences,
in fact, only grew throughout the 1990s. Ankara’s traditional understand-
ing of security threats effectively created a gulf between it and many EU
member-states, especially as the latter perceived the principal security chal-
lenges as emanating from nonstate actors and forces arising from global-
ization. Most EU members did not perceive existential security threats
stemming from state actors in the Middle East, WMD (weapons of mass
destruction) arsenals held by Turkey’s neighbours, or the nature of those
regimes themselves. Constructive engagement based on economic and
political transactions, UN-led multilateral diplomacy, and long-term aid
designed to eliminate the underlying causes of poverty were viewed as the
3 Mustafa Aydin, “Securitization of history and geography: Understanding of security in Turkey,”
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 3, no.2 (2003): 163-84; and Mustafa Aydin, “The
determinants of Turkish foreign policy and Turkey’s European connection,” The Review of
International Affairs 3 (winter 2003): 306-31.
4 As an aside, one can clearly notice the state-centric and geopolitical perspectives in the
Turkish view of ESDP. Having underestimated the impact of the EU’s integration process and
distinctive security identity on the European attempts at building European military capability,
Turkey rushed to join the ESDP’s decision-making process as a troop-contributing country.
Many in Turkey thought that the EU had finally started to develop a global security vision that
would rely in part on a common European military force. The traditional Turkish elites also inter-
preted such EU attempts as a deliberate effort to counter or balance the United States.
Conceived of in this way, it was not difficult for Turkish leaders to evaluate the status of non-
membership in this new arrangement from a “self-other” dichotomy. The frequently asked ques-
tion in Turkey was how likely the EU members would continue to see Turkey as European in the
post–Cold War era within the framework of this developing global strategic identity. This was
especially worrying since security relations have long been one of the significant links connect-
ing Turkey to Europe. Responding to the EU’s rejection of its participation in the decision-mak-
ing mechanisms of the ESDP as an equal party, Turkey vetoed the EU’s right of assured access
to the assets of the Atlantic alliance. After lengthy negotiations that addressed Ankara’s concern
that the EU could use a European military force against it over Cyprus, the parties sorted out
this problem in December 2002.
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best means to deal with the security problems perceived by the EU. Turkey,
on the other hand, widened the scope of issues that might be viewed as soft-
security threats but also continued to regard its Middle Eastern neighbours
as the sources of hard-core security threats. Indeed, in the post–Cold War
years, while the scope of issues seen as security threats decreased inside the
EU, the opposite was the case as far as Turkey was concerned. Any dialogue
between Turkey and the EU on such issues was therefore limited by funda-
mentally divergent security conceptualizations.
A fifth problem attached to the pursuit of EU membership was based
on the well-founded Turkish view that for Europe not to be seen as a secu-
rity threat in Turkey, the latter needs to become a part of the former.
Eliminating fears of dismemberment, isolation, and abandonment, such as
the Ottoman empire had experienced, Turkey would have to be seen as
European by the EU circles themselves.5 Indeed, the main rationale behind
the westernization/Europeanization reforms of the late Ottoman and early
republican eras was to secure the survival of the Turkish state against inter-
nal and external threats. Europeanization was therefore conceived of as a
security strategy. One could best observe the traces of this psychology in
Turkey’s response to the EU’s demand for the liberalization of its economy
and democratization of its political culture. Both demands seemed to
threaten the strong state constructed in response to these fears. Dealing
with these issues constitutes the present dilemma for Turkey’s traditional
elites. On the one hand lies the legitimacy of the decades-long westerniza-
tion process as launched by the founders of the republic: on the other hand
lies the possibility that reforms being advanced by the AKP might indirect-
ly contribute to the weakening of the main tenets of the republican regime,
as has been demanded by the traditional opponents of the regime.
The last reason that EU accession might be problematic is due to
Ankara’s close link with Washington. Turkey’s traditional elites have taken
comfort in the fact that the US has long supported their country’s aspira-
tions for EU membership. A long-held assumption was that EU members
were not capable of thinking strategically, and that Washington had the
most influence in promoting the significance of Turkey for Europe’s secu-
rity. This view, however, meant that Turkey felt no need to undertake the
costly reforms at home that were demanded by the EU membership
5 H. Tarýk Oguzlu, “An analysis of Turkey’s prospective membership in the European Union
from a ‘security’ perspective,” Security Dialogue 34, no. 3 (2003): 285-99.
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process. Turkey’s leadership appears to have failed to recognize the transat-
lantic gulf that was emerging throughout the 1990s. The more the rift
between the US and EU grew, the less influence the US had with regard to
promoting Turkey’s aspiration for EU membership. Indeed, US support for
that goal helped remind some EU members of the danger of having anoth-
er Trojan horse (recalling earlier French concerns about the United
Kingdom) inside the EU.6
DEBATES AFTER THE DECEMBER 1999 HELSINKI SUMMIT
At the Helsinki summit in December 1999, the EU confirmed Turkey’s
candidacy. This decision was a significant step toward reducing the ambi-
guity that had long characterized the EU’s attitude towards Turkey. Since
then, a sophisticated and rational debate has been taking place inside
Turkey as to the costs and benefits of the EU accession process, let alone full
membership status.7 The main reason why such an internal debate started
in the wake of the Helsinki summit is that the prospects of accession to the
union had increased. For the first time in EU-Turkey relations, a new set of
views and opinions of the EU started to emerge. The 9/11 terrorist attacks
on the US, the accession to government of the AKP, and the US-led war in
Iraq have accelerated this process. Before moving to examine the impact of
these developments on Turkey’s approach towards the EU, it is useful to
summarize concisely the arguments of the two main sides in this debate.
First, there is what might be termed the Euroskeptic discourse. The
adherents of this discourse come from a disparate grouping of organiza-
tions and institutions, including the Democratic Left Party, Nationalist
Action Party, the former Welfare Party, elements of the Republican People’s
Party, some senior officers in the general staff, and a large portion of the
well-established state bureaucracy. This group questions the current form
of the EU in general, and the structure of the accession process that Turkey
is undergoing in particular. Consistent with their inclination to see the EU
as an intergovernmental institution, these circles have found it difficult to
6 Ziya Onis, “Turkey-EU-US triangle in perspective: Transformation or continuity,”
http://home.ku.edu.tr; see also Bruce Kuniholm, “Turkey’s accession to the European Union:
Differences in US and European attitudes and challenges for Turkey,” Turkish Studies 2, no. 1
(2001): 25-53.
7 H. Tarýk Oguzlu, “ How to interpret Turkey’s accession process with the European Union,”
Perceptions 7, no. 4 (2002-03): 51-83.
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accept that the relationship with the EU would be asymmetric. The EU
skeptics support integration as long as the whole process relies on a bilat-
eral negotiation process open to give-and-take, rather than the imposition
of Brussels’ views on Ankara. To them, both parties need each other and
therefore the negotiation process should take place between two equals.
The Euroskeptics tend to characterize the accession process as an EU
policy, the main goals of which are to de-emphasize Turkey’s geopolitically
defined strategic identity, and to create the best possible conditions for
Brussels to manage constructively Turkey’s membership aspirations.
Within this perspective, it is inconceivable that the accession process can
serve the security interests of both the EU and Turkey. A basic assumption
is that the EU will not (and cannot) admit Turkey as a full member for secu-
rity reasons. The Euroskeptics also believe that the EU discriminates
against Turkey, a largely Muslim country, on cultural, political, and eco-
nomic grounds, and they point to Brussels’ preferential treatment of the
membership applications from the central and eastern European countries
as evidence.8 Lastly, there is also a parochial dimension that the
Euroskeptics draw attention to, namely that the main concern of Brussels
will be to adapt successfully to the membership of the central and eastern
European countries that have already joined the EU. As a consequence, dur-
ing the next decade, the EU will not really be interested in Turkish member-
ship as it will not have the required economic resources to cope with the
problems of integrating Turkey.9 Declining public support within a number
of EU member-states towards further enlargement and the focus of govern-
ments on ratification (sometimes by referendum) of the EU constitution, if
it ever happens, will constitute additional barriers to Turkey’s accession.
Equally, the Euroskeptics have focused on the domestic political impli-
cations in Turkey of EU membership. They argue that, rather than con-
tributing to the emergence of a healthy liberal-pluralist political environ-
ment, the ongoing accession process will significantly damage the internal
peace in Turkey, whose foundations have rested upon the Lausanne treaty
of 1923 and the political reforms of Ataturk. The sensitivity of some mem-
bers of the elite concerning the founding principles of the republic, name-
8 Ziya Önis, “Turkey, Europe, and paradoxes of identity: Perspectives on the international con-
text of democratisation,” Mediterranean Quarterly (summer 1999): 107-36.
9 Nergis Canefe and Tanil Bora, “Intellectual roots of anti-European sentiments in Turkish pol-
itics: The case of radical Turkish nationalism,” Turkish Studies 4, no. 1 (2003): 127-48.
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ly secularism and an all-inclusive Turkish nationalism, has generated sus-
picions with regard to specific EU demands.10 As Turkey is the heir to the
Ottoman empire, a multireligious and multinational polity, Euroskeptics
believe that it is entirely justified for Ankara to be sensitive about these
issues and reluctant to embrace rapid changes to existing policies.
Lurking behind such arguments lies the main reason for this skepti-
cism, namely that Turkey’s stability would be undermined if all of these lib-
eral reforms are implemented but the EU still does not admit Turkey. For
these liberal reforms to produce and augment security and stability in
Turkey, full membership in the union is a must: otherwise, Turkey would
be exposed to international pressures while vocal ethnic separatist and
political Islamist circles inside the country demand more reform that would
threaten further instability. In this situation, democratization might well
lead to further Islamization of state-society relations and serious decentral-
ization of the unitary state structure along ethnic and federal lines. Such a
situation can only remind the Turkish elite of the last years of the enfeebled
Ottoman empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as it became a
puppet of the European powers.
The second approach found in contemporary Turkey is the pro-EU dis-
course. This perspective views the accession process as a means of ensur-
ing and accelerating Turkey’s inclusion in the EU as a full member. The
adherents of this view include, among others, the Turkish Industrialists and
Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD), the Economic Development
Foundation (IKV), the Motherland Party, the True Path Party, and some ele-
ments of the Republican People’s Party. They are committed to the idea of
European integration and are content with the current structure of the EU.
This discourse strongly emphasizes what Turkey needs to do to obtain EU
membership, for after all it is Turkey knocking at that organization’s door.
The underlying assumption here is that as the accession process unfolds,
the quality of Turkey’s relationship with the EU will improve. Turkish secu-
rity will be positively affected because Ankara will gradually embrace the
EU’s distinctive security identity, not the other way around. According to
this logic, therefore, if Turkey preserves its enthusiasm in seeking compli-
ance with the Copenhagen criteria and fulfils the required steps that the
10 Henri J. Barkey, “The struggles of a ‘strong’ state,” Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 1
(2000): 87-105, and Hasan Kösebalaban, “Turkey’s EU membership: A clash of security cul-
tures,” Middle East Policy 9, no. 2 (2002): 130-46.
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Helsinki conclusions and the accession partnership document define, it
will be harder for the EU to delay the start of the accession talks. It is also
presumed that once the accession talks start, it will be somewhat automat-
ic for the EU to admit Turkey as a member. The legacy of the EU’s enlarge-
ment process would suggest this outcome, and concerns about geopolitical
issues and civilizational differences should not arise.
Those who are pro-EU look at security from a different perspective than
that shared by Euroskeptics. In an age of diminished threats from other
states, they argue that the main security referents in Turkey should be soci-
ety in general, and each Turkish citizen in particular.11 Turkey’s accession
process with the EU is, therefore, good for the country due to the promo-
tion of pluralism and the liberalization of domestic political life. The pro-
EU group believes that Turkey can only solve the problem of Kurdish sepa-
ratism and the challenge of accommodating political Islam through the
process of democratization of society as a whole.12 They fear that if Turkey
turns away from the EU, no credible incentive would continue to exist for
the traditional state elites to try to embrace peaceful solutions for such
issues
Of the two, the pro-EU perspective gained the upper hand during the
1999-2002 period. Turkey’s traditionally skeptical view of the EU started
to change. The military victory over the PKK and the rapprochement with
Greece helped contribute to the emergence of a more favourable environ-
ment for undertaking radical EU-related reforms at home and adopting a
more pro-EU oriented foreign policy abroad, particularly with regard to
Cyprus. Nevertheless, the most significant external development that has
helped produce a EU-friendly atmosphere in Turkey was the 9/11 attacks
on the United States. Because its population is largely Muslim, Turkey was
faced with the risk of the erosion of the west’s acceptance of its European
identity as a result of the US-led war against terrorism emanating from
some parts of the Islamic world. The overwhelming majority of Turkey’s
political and bureaucratic elites have therefore begun to see Ankara’s
membership in the EU as the most important barrier against this hap-
pening. These elites came to believe that Turkey’s significance for the
11 Ihsan Dagi, “Human rights and democratisation: Turkish politics in the European context,”
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 1, no. 3 (2001): 51-68.
12 Soli Özel, “After the tsunami,” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 2 (2003); 80-94.
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western community (a grouping that includes the United States and mem-
bers of the EU) would likely increase after 9/11 due to Ankara’s secular ori-
entation at home and pro-western orientation abroad. As a result, some pol-
icy makers started to see the goal of Turkey’s membership in the EU as an
important, possibly vital, national interest.
THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY (AKP) AND 9/11
After 9/11, the accession to power in Ankara of an Islamist political party in
November 2002 left many western governments uncertain of the future
direction of Turkish politics. Such concerns have, however, proven unwar-
ranted. For the majority of the people who voted for the AKP, the main rea-
son for doing so was not the Islamist agenda of the party, but its pro-
European/pro-western international outlook and neoliberal economic poli-
cies. The failure of the old parties to deliver economic success and the
shifting of the economic centre from the Istanbul-based TUSIAD to the
Anatolian Tigers13 contributed to the electoral triumph of the AKP.14 It is
also important to note that the mainstream of political Islam in Turkey has
undergone a transformation in recent years. As a result of the antiwestern,
antisecularist and antidemocratic outlook represented by the Welfare Party
and Necmettin Erbakan in the mid-1990s, western governments might
have failed to recognize the paradox that emerged on 3 November 2002:
namely an Islamist government in Ankara that was more pro-EU than its
rigidly secular predecessors.
There are several reasons why the AKP leadership views membership
in the EU to be a key national interest for Turkey, particularly when
assessed in terms of national security. The first is that Turkey can most
effectively cope with the security challenges and risks of the globalization
process by integrating with the global community through the EU acces-
sion process.15 For Turkey to avoid fragmentation or dismemberment
13 Anatolian Tigers is the name used for the medium- and small-sized economic entrepreneurs
located in different parts of Anatolia, rather than Istanbul. They are assumed to challenge the
Istanbul-based TUSIAD. Compared to the members of TUSIAD, the Anatolian Tigers are more
sensitive to Islam and Turkey’s conservative norms.
14 E. Fuat Keyman and Ziya Onis, “A new path emerges,” The Journal of Democracy 14, no. 2
(2003): 95-107.
15 Kemal Kirisci, “Between Europe and the Middle East: The transformation of Turkish politics,”
MERIA Journal 8, no. 1 (March 2004).
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through globalization (the most serious security threat Turkey faces), the
safest strategy is to evolve into a liberal-pluralistic democracy. This will be
pushed forward by the EU’s integration process. Such an approach will like-
ly be successful at home since many Turks regard Europeanization as a
legitimate globalization strategy, and many believe it will bring Turkey closer
to the sources of its western/European identity.
Equally importantly, Turkey would be better able to deal with the cen-
trifugal effects of globalization as a result of EU membership. If threats and
risks to individual and societal needs are far more important than the tra-
ditional threats to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, Turkey
will more easily address this new security understanding by trying to meet
the EU’s accession criteria, for the EU’s conception of security clearly
shapes these criteria. The idea that more security would come through
more freedom and devolution of sovereignty to nonstate actors is prevalent
within the EU, and Turkey is slowly adopting the same outlook.
Globalization through Europeanization does not mean that the capacity of
the Turkish state to deal with new kind of threats would decrease. Indeed,
the Turkish state’s ability in this regard would likely increase. It is worth
mentioning in this regard that Turkey has been one of the few countries in
the post-9/11 era that has increased the scope of rights and freedoms of cit-
izens, while at the same time dealing with new and growing security
threats, such as religious terrorism.16
A third reason for the AKP’s interest in the EU is purely economic. It
is quite likely that Turkey would attract new foreign investment if it is
viewed as politically stable and a member of the western community of
states. To support this argument, one need only point to the early example
of two economic giants of the EU, namely Fiat and Mercedes-Benz, that
have recently applied to Ankara to move their regional headquarters and
manufacturing plants to Turkey. These applications followed by only one
day the government’s decision to let foreign nationals set up businesses in
Turkey. One can argue, therefore, that the quickest way to guarantee con-
tinued foreign investment like this is the successful completion of the EU’s
accession process.
16 Mim Kemal Oke, Dervis ve Komutan: Ozgurluk ve Demokrasi Sarkacindaki Turkiye’nin Kimlik
Sorunu [Priest and the Commander: Turkey’s Identity Question at the Intersection of Freedom
and Security] (Istanbul: Alfa Yayinlari, 2004).
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The war on terror is also a factor behind the AKP’s position. During
the ongoing war, Ankara’s membership in the EU will assist in increasing
both its hard and soft power resources. For those who make this argument,
EU membership might well assist the greater Middle East project recently
announced by the US, for the main reason that Turkey is the clearest exam-
ple of a working democracy in the Islamic world.17 The attractiveness of the
Turkish model in the Islamic world is, nevertheless, more complicated than
most commentators appreciate, and is contingent on the successful imple-
mentation of the reforms required by the EU’s accession process. The tra-
ditional Kemalist understanding of top-down Turkish modernization
includes the basic assumption that further modernization would be con-
comitant with further Europeanization (including the continued adoption
of Europe’s positivism and unitary nation-state ideology).
There is, moreover, a basic compatibility of the Kemalist model and
Islam. A second Turkish model, more consistent with the AKP’s approach,
also emphasizes the urgency of modernization/Europeanization. It differs
from the purely Kemalist model in holding that such processes can take
place only through further democratization and liberalization in a bottom-
up manner. Importantly, this version holds that Islam is compatible with
democracy and modernization, an argument that might well appeal to the
large Muslim populations in the Middle East.18 For Turkey’s secular democ-
racy to be attractive for others, it needs to be reconstituted within a liberal-
pluralistic framework.
Basic balance of power thinking is another reason for the AKP’s sup-
port to membership in the EU. It is reasonable to assume that Turkey would
increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis the United States by improving the
quality of its relations with the EU. Given that the degree of interdepend-
ency of US-Turkish relations is highly favourable to the United States, a
weak and non-Europeanizing Turkey would not be able to stand up to
American demands. The latest Iraqi crisis demonstrated the fragile rela-
tionship between the US and Turkey, as they could not cooperate due to the
17 Omer Taspinar, “An uneven fit? The ‘Turkish model’ and the Arab world: US policy towards
the Islamic world,” The Brookings Institution, analysis paper no. 5, August 2000, www.brook-
ings.org; and Graham E. Fuller, “Turkey’s strategic model: Myths and realities,” The Washington
Quarterly 27 (summer 2004): 51-64.
18 Michael Hirsh, “Bernard Lewis revisited: What if Islam isn’t an obstacle to democracy in the
Middle East, but the secret to achieving it?” The Washington Monthly, November 2004, 13-19.
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existence of mutual suspicions over each other’s real intentions. The EU
played a balancing role in this regard mainly because of the fact that the
Turkish leadership paid close attention to the Europeans before formulat-
ing its own view, particularly concerning the American demands to use
Turkey’s territory as a launching pad. In Iraq, Turkey and several of the EU
members shared similar interests. For both, any US-led war to topple
Saddam was viewed as illegitimate and unnecessary. While Turkey was alert
to the possibility that any war in Iraq might lead to the emergence of an
independent Kurdish state, many EU members were concerned that the US
might resort to unilateral security actions elsewhere. The EU factor would
also play a balancing role in another sense. If Turkey did not have a Kurdish
problem at home, it would have certainly faced the US demands more con-
fidently. The EU is important here because only through the reforms under-
taken during the EU membership process can Turkey resolve its Kurdish
dispute. If the Kurdish problem were solved, Turkey’s relevance to the
United States will be far less dependent on Turkey’s military capabilities
and geostrategic location, as used to be the case, and more on its identity as
a Muslim democracy. Indeed, Turkey’s attractiveness as a US ally in the war
on terror, as well as Ankara’s ability to negotiate with foreign governments,
would likely increase if Turkey could solve its internal (mainly radical
Islamist and separatist Kurdish) security problems through pluralization
and liberalization of domestic political order.19
In this regard, it is important to note that as long as Turkey suffers from
a domestic Kurdish problem, it will always feel somewhat threatened by what
happens in northern Iraq. The ambiguity of the US policy on the Kurdish
enclave in that region has inflamed this feeling. If Turkey did not have a
Kurdish problem at home, one would be justified in assuming that Turkey’s
responses to developments in northern Iraq would likely have been quite dif-
ferent. It is not being argued here that Turkey might (or should) turn to lead-
ing members of the EU for help against the Kurds or the United States.
Instead, the EU (in fact, the ongoing accession process) is an instrument that
might enable Turkey to resolve the Kurdish dispute, and then to face foreign
policy issues, including security challenges and great power relations, more
confidently. In other words, closer integration with the EU, including
19 H. Tarik Oguzlu, “Changing dynamics of Turkey’s US and EU Relations,” The Middle East
Policy 11 (spring 2004): 98-105.
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membership, would, according to the AKP leadership, assist in removing
political vulnerabilities that currently limit Turkey’s foreign policy options.
It is as a result of this thinking that Turkey has attempted to reconcile
its foreign and security policy preferences with those of the EU in the post-
9/11 era. This process started well before the US-led war in Iraq in the
spring of 2003. Turkey has not only moved closer to the EU in terms of the
way it defines the conditions of security at home, it has also started to
embrace more pro-EU-oriented stances on some particular foreign policy
issues. The first clear example in this regard was in December 2002 short-
ly after the AKP assumed office, when Turkey finally came to an agreement
on the modalities of the EU using NATO’s military capabilities in EU-led
and EU-only missions. In addition to this, Ankara adopted positions simi-
lar to those of other EU countries, on such issues as the US demand to use
Turkish territory to launch its war to oust the Saddam regime, the US
request to deploy Turkish forces in central Iraq to help the US-led coalition
forces achieve stability, the US request to deploy NATO forces into Iraq in
the post-Saddam era, and on the Israel-Palestinian dispute. Even though
EU members themselves often had different opinions and/or policy stances
on these issues, Turkey’s own position was closer to that of France or
Germany, two leading members of the EU, than it was to the US. Despite
the fact that German and French interests in Iraq did not always coincide
with those of Turkey, these three could at least agree on the following
points: any US-led military involvement in Iraq would be illegitimate with-
out UN endorsement; the continuation of Saddam’s rule in Baghdad would
better ensure the territorial integrity of the country; the decades-long sanc-
tions regime did play a significant role in the elimination of weapons of
mass destruction; rather than putting troops on the ground to overthrow
Saddam, the western community should replace the ongoing sanctions
regime with smart sanctions; and the deployment of NATO troops without
the UN-ization of the dispute would not make things better, but would only
support the US-led military occupation of Iraq. It is also worth mentioning
in this regard that when the Turkish parliament authorized the deployment
of around 10,000 troops to south and central Iraq in response to a US
request in late 2003, Ankara sought assurances from Berlin and Paris as to
whether such a Turkish presence in Iraq would negatively affect its EU
accession prospects. If the German and French governments had openly
criticized this Turkish decision, which they did not, Turkey would probably
have not taken such a decision.
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Turkey and the EU not only have similar policies on Iraq, but they also
share similar views on how to pursue relations with Iran, and how to con-
tribute to the democratization of the greater Middle East region. Rather
than labelling Iran as part of an “axis of evil” and urging coercive measures
against it, both Turkey and the EU concur that a policy of constructive
engagement or a critical dialogue based on credible incentives and costly
punishments would likely yield better results in terms of cooperation on
nonproliferation of WMD. Both Ankara and EU capitals believe the idea
that external pressures, coercive strategies, and an immediate regime
change would not likely result in true democratization. Instead, both hold
that a long-term strategy of economic development and political liberaliza-
tion, especially emanating from internal dynamics, would more likely result
in democratization in the years ahead.
It is also important to note here that the current government’s pro-EU
positions on domestic and foreign issues have been embraced, not only by
figures in the AKP, but also by the allegedly more Euroskeptic Turkish gen-
erals.20 Many senior military commanders now view Turkey’s membership
in the EU as being in the country’s interest, and this attitude is becoming
more entrenched. Both the political elite and the military establishment
have started to see the reforms undertaken within the EU accession process
as strengthening Ankara’s international profile. Indeed, statements by many
senior generals indicate that the Turkish armed forces (TAF) have began to
define Turkey’s security identity and interests in a way consistent with EU
norms and principles.21 The new emphasis on economic development and
political liberalization at home, and participation in multilateral peacekeep-
ing operations and the use of economic diplomacy abroad, attest to this
changing rationale. This attitude helps explain the acceptance of radical cuts
in defence budgets, as well as reducing the overt political profile of the
armed forces. While some observers, both at home and abroad, still believe
that the TAF opposes the EU related reforms, in fact the opposite is the case.
The TAF is only suspicious of the potentially negative impact such reforms
might have on Atatürk’s legacy should Turkey’s efforts not be reciprocated by
the EU. The years since 1999 have demonstrated that the less ambiguous the
20 Speech by deputy chief of staff, Yasar Buyukanit, conference on globalization and security,
Turkish War Academy, 29-30 May 2003, www.tsk.mil.tr.
21 Ibid.
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EU’s approach towards Turkey has been, the more positive the military
establishment in Turkey is toward the passage and implementation of EU-
related reforms.
Interestingly, the AKP has also argued that Turkey’s accession would in
fact be in the EU’s own interest. Such reasoning manifests itself in some
particular ways. First, Turkish leaders, including Prime Minister Erdogan,
have pointed to the close linkage between Turkey’s accession to the EU and
the EU’s future identity. They have argued that if the EU does not start the
accession talks with Turkey after the latter has implemented numerous sig-
nificant reforms, the EU would contradict its own identity. Turkish leaders
have argued, instead, that if the EU’s future identity is to reflect multicul-
turalism, secularism, tolerance, and a multispeed integration process, then
it is logically impossible to reject Turkey’s membership application.22 In this
regard, the AKP has strongly rejected any form of special status short of full
membership for Turkey within the EU. (Such an approach had been urged
by some leaders of the Christian Democratic Union in Germany as an alter-
native to full membership.) Erdogan has argued publicly that the credibility
of the EU in the eyes of the international community would likely decrease if
Turkey were not treated fairly.23
Some AKP leaders have also tried to convince skeptical Europeans of
the international political value of Turkey’s accession.24 They assert that, just
as Spain has been the gate of the EU to the Latino-Hispanic world, Turkey
can play a similar role in support of the EU’s outreach to the Middle East
and to central Asia. Middle Eastern countries will likely see Turkey as a role
model if the latter is Europeanized and if its Europeanization efforts are
rewarded by the EU. Indeed, AKP leaders have tended to define Turkey’s
bridge identity as constitutive of its own European identity. Turkey’s capacity
to play this kind of a bridging role has been significantly increased in the post-
9/11 era. The joint summit between the EU and the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC) held in Istanbul in Spring 2002 proved to be prom-
ising in this regard. Increasing EU-OIC convergence on the Israel-Palestine
dispute alongside Turkey’s special relationship with Israel, and Ankara’s
22 Kemal Kirisci and Zeynep Gulsah Capan, “Turkey on the edges of convention on the ‘future
of Europe’,” South European Society and Politics 9 (summer 2004): 173-91.
23 See Erdogan’s speech at Harvard University, www.mfa.gov.tr.
24 Ibid.
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success in getting the OIC to elect Turkey’s candidate as the secretary
general of the OIC on 15 June 2004, would seem to support this assessment.
To AKP circles, Turkey’s accession would tell the US that the EU is con-
tributing to the stabilization of Europe’s peripheries, thereby allowing
Washington to concentrate its efforts and resources on more serious and trou-
bled areas, such as central and east Asia. Indeed, both Turkish military and
political elites believe that the success of the EU’s recently announced neigh-
bourhood policy might be positively affected by Turkey’s membership. This
would send the strongest signal, it can be argued, to the Muslim world that
the EU does not define its security identity and its interests in opposition to
the Muslim world. In this regard, one can claim that the terrorist attacks in
Madrid in spring 2004 have brought the EU closer to Turkey, for these blasts
have very clearly demonstrated that Europe is not immune from radical ter-
rorism, thereby reinforcing the coherence of the antiterror coalition.
More generally, the AKP leadership has argued that Turkey’s member-
ship in the EU would bolster the claims of those who argue that the war on
terrorism should not be viewed as a clash of civilization between the devel-
oped Christian north and the underdeveloped Muslim south.25 Because the
furtherance of democratization and liberalization is increasingly consid-
ered an effective means of combating religious extremism, the EU’s role in
projecting democracy to the Middle East might become important in the
years to come.26 Turkey’s inclusion in the EU might well strengthen the
EU’s hand in this regard.
A CASE STUDY:
TURKEY’S CHANGING RATIONALE ON THE CYPRUS DISPUTE
Evidence of Ankara’s new approach to relations with the EU can be
found very clearly in Turkey’s changing policy on Cyprus. The Erdogan
25 Recep Tayyip Erdogan, “Turkey, Islam and the West,” Global Agenda, January 2004, and
Abdullah Gul, “Turkey’s role in a changing Middle East environment,” Mediterranean Quarterly
(winter 2004): 1-7. See also Timothy M. Savage, “Europe and Islam: Crescent waxing, cultures
clashing,” The Washington Quarterly 27 (summer 2004): 25-50.
26 “Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?” Report of the Independent Commission on
Turkey, September 2004, 18; Richard Youngs, “The European Union and democracy promotion
in the Mediterranean: A new or disingenuous strategy,” Democratization 9 (spring 2002): 40-
63; and Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs, “Themes in European democracy promotion,”
Democratization 9 (spring 2002): 1-16.
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government has increasingly recognized the linkage between its Cyprus
policy and Turkey-EU relations. In the past, Turkish leaders tended to argue
that the two issues were separate from each other. The determination of the
current government to see that the Cyprus dispute no longer acts as an
obstacle to Turkey’s membership in the EU is therefore unprecedented. In
formulating its policy, Ankara seems to have assumed that the need on the
part of the EU to admit a unified Cyprus was so great that Turkey could
make use of this situation to its advantage. By linking Turkey’s contribution
to the settlement of the Cyprus dispute to its own membership prospects,
the AKP government appears to have first assumed that the EU would need
to come closer to Turkey if it wanted the island to enter the union as a sin-
gle entity. This was later to change, but the Erdogan government nonethe-
less viewed the Cyprus dispute as an opportunity for improving and deep-
ening relations with the EU.
In analyzing the AKP’s Cyprus policy, one needs to look at three phas-
es in its development. The first period ran from the accession to power by
the AKP (November 2002) to the EU’s Copenhagen summit (December
2002) when EU leaders were to decide which candidate countries would be
invited to join in May 2004. The opinion in Ankara was that the summit
would, at the very least, announce a date for the start of the accession talks
with Turkey, for Ankara had been undertaking radical reforms for the pre-
vious four years or since the Helsinki summit. These expectations were but-
tressed by the active US support given to Turkey’s bid for EU membership.
Many Turkish leaders believed that US lobbying efforts on behalf of Turkey
would likely help produce a Turkey-friendly decision at the Copenhagen
summit. At this time, Turkey’s Cyprus policy was defined by the AKP’s sup-
port for the initial version of the Annan plan, which mainly aimed at end-
ing the division of the island before its accession to the EU. As well, the
leading figures of the AKP did not exchange polemics with President Rauf
Denktas of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and, instead,
pleaded with him to negotiate with the Greek Cypriots. Throughout this
period Erdogan traveled to several EU capitals to lobby for Turkey’s mem-
bership. The expectations of a positive outcome for these efforts produced
a pro-EU-oriented Cyprus policy in this period.
The second phase began with the announcement at the Copenhagen
summit that the EU would decide in December 2004 whether or not to set
a date for the start of the accession talks with Turkey. It ended with the
TRNC’s parliamentary elections in December 2003. During this period,
¸
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Turkey was first and foremost concerned with the quality of its relations
with the United States. The ups and down experienced in US-Turkish rela-
tions as a result of the war in Iraq did not create a suitable atmosphere for
the AKP to focus its energy on the Cyprus dispute. Many in Turkey had crit-
icized the AKP government’s attempts at influencing the parliament to
allow US troops to enter Iraq from Turkey, and it would have been very dif-
ficult at best for the government to argue for the merits of the Annan plan
in public. The ambiguous EU conclusions in Copenhagen and the increas-
ing US demands on Turkey over Iraq combined to reawaken nationalist
feelings. The anti-EU and anti-Annan plan stance of Denktas, who had long
enjoyed a high level of popularity in Turkey, also made it difficult for the
AKP government to appear supportive of the plan. Therefore, the govern-
ment’s public support for the Annan plan decreased. It was also unable to
apply sufficient pressure on Denktas to go to the Hague in early March
2003 to discuss the Annan plan with the Greek Cypriot leadership in a last-
minute effort to forge a settlement before the Republic of Cyprus acceded
to the EU. As a result, the Greek-Cypriot Republic of Cyprus was admitted
to the EU on 16 April 2003.
Even though the AKP leadership continued to believe that the Annan
plan constituted a suitable ground for the solution of the dispute, it had to
soften its public support for tactical concerns. Domestic political consider-
ations rendered any other approach impossible.27 It would not be an over-
estimation to argue that the government found itself caught between two
opposing forces. On the one hand, there was the growing influence of
nationalist feelings in Turkey, while on the other lay the demands of the EU
membership process that the government wanted to meet: each demanded
a different response to the Annan plan. The government, for example, sup-
ported Denktas’s decision to open the border to the Greek Cypriots on 23
April 2003, thereby bolstering the Turkish Cypriot leader’s position at home
and improving his image abroad. Such a move was also in accord with the
prevailing mood in Turkey that allowed constructive steps to be taken so
long as they were not forced on the TRNC by outside powers. Just three
months later, however, the Erdogan government hesitated to sign a formal
customs union agreement with the TRNC, and instead initialled a customs
27 Meltem Muftuler-Bac, “The new face of Turkey: The domestic and foreign policy implications
of November 2002 elections,” East European Quarterly 37 (January 2004): 421-38.
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union framework agreement. This lower-level agreement was adopted
mainly because the EU authorities had made it clear that if Turkey created
a customs union with the TRNC, it would certainly contradict the EU’s
rules and the terms of the Turkey-EU customs union.28 Turkish leaders were
uncertain how to proceed, but they clearly hesitated before pursuing
policies that might damage future relations with the EU.
The last phase of the AKP government’s policy on Cyprus coincided
with the gradual improvement of relations with the US and the December
2003 TRNC parliamentary elections that saw the victory of pro-Annan Plan
and pro-EU political parties. These developments led Erdogan in early-
2004 to urge UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to resume negotiations
based on his plan. The parliamentary elections had significantly weakened
Denktas’s position and good relations with the US reduced the popular
anger that had constrained the government’s earlier efforts to affect a solu-
tion to this issue. This time, therefore, the political environment at home
was ripe for the Erdogan government to argue openly for the Annan plan.
From early February to late March 2004, the parties conducted inter-
communal talks on the basis of the Annan plan, and on 1 April all parties
concerned decided to put the latest version to referendums in both parts of
the island on 24 April. While the Turkish Cypriots overwhelmingly voted for
the plan, the majority of the Greek Cypriots rejected it. Throughout this
process, the Turkish government had strongly supported the Annan plan
and promised to work for its approval by the Turkish Cypriot Community.
Despite the failure of the Annan plan to obtain approval by the Greek-
Cypriot community, Ankara’s policy brought an end to the three and a half
decades of criticism of its position from the international community,
including the EU. Some commentators predicted that Cyprus would still
prove to be a stumbling block at the EU’s December 2004 summit, when a
decision on opening accession talks was due to be decided. However, the
Erdogan government’s approach had effectively diverted the attention for
the failure to resolve the divided island’s problem away from Ankara and
the TRNC toward the Republic of Cyprus itself. 29 The European Union did
28 Simsir, AB, AKP ve Kibris, 568-69.
29 Kofi Annan, “Report of the secretary-general on his mission of good-offices in Cyprus,” 28
May 2004, http://ods-dds-ny.un.org.
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not keep its promise to help ease the economic hardships of the TRNC or
to gradually lift the economic embargo as goodwill measures in response to
the overwhelming support of the Turkish Cypriots for the Annan plan. It is
nonetheless noteworthy that Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulos has
continued to attract the main criticism of the EU, as well as the US, and that
Turkey was given a date at the EU’s Brussels summit in December 2004 for
the start of the accession talks in October 2005 despite the objections of the
Greek Cypriot leadership.
CONCLUSION
The Europeanization policies of the current AKP government reflect more
the convictions of party leaders and less purely tactical/instrumental rea-
sons. The fear that the AKP is implementing broad reforms in order to cre-
ate the best political environment for Turkey’s re-Islamization seems to be
highly exaggerated. On the contrary, that an allegedly pro-Islamic party is
willing to undertake broad pro-western reforms shows how deeply a quite
significant majority of Turkey’s population has embraced the goal of west-
ernization. The attitude of the AKP towards the Europeanization process
can legitimately be seen as the internalization of western values promoted
by the secular Kemalist founders of the republic, and by a quiet majority of
the people. The changing geopolitical structure and equations in the post-
9/11 era, the dynamics of Turkey-US relations in the aftermath of the US-
led war in Iraq, and the increasing EU interest in Turkey, have all con-
tributed to the emergence of a pro-EU oriented atmosphere in Turkey.
Turkey’s structural economic conditions, its growing population, and
its distinctive Muslim culture, alongside the EU’s difficulties in digesting
the membership of the recently admitted central and eastern European
countries, remain obstacles to Turkey’s accession. The need for EU leaders
to convince skeptical public opinion in their countries, particularly in
France, of the value of Turkish accession to the EU might create an addi-
tional problem for Ankara. However, as the EU commission’s report of 6
October 2004 has made clear, Turkey has now satisfied the political aspects
of the Copenhagen criteria, a precondition for the accession talks to start
with any aspirant country. Gunther Verheugen, the EU commissioner for
enlargement, has stated that there are no more obstacles in Turkey’s way.30
30 See Zornitsa M. Stoyanova-Yerburgh, “Turkey and the European Union: One step closer,” 26
September 2004, www.worldpress.org.
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The majority of both the Turkish elite and the EU’s member-states are cog-
nizant of the fact that Turkey’s full membership might take many years to
realize. Nevertheless, it will be more difficult for the EU to adhere to its tra-
ditional ambiguous policy towards Turkey in the face of the latter’s grow-
ing determination to join the EU, its evident willingness to implement the
necessary reforms, and the commencement of accession talks in October
2005.
